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INTRODUCTION 
The United States health-care system revolves around a small 
number of powerful actors, including insurers, providers, and patients. 
To date, many attempts at health-care reform have merely shifted costs 
from one group to another. One such attempt occurred in 2010, when 
the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) in the 
Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS) implemented the 
Recovery Audit Contractor (“RAC”) program.1 While the program 
successfully reduced overpayments to hospitals paid by Medicare,2 it 
also led to an unprecedented rise in appeals of Medicare payment 
decisions by health-care providers.3 Because of this rise in appeals, there 
is a significant backlog at the Office of Medicare Hearings and Appeals 
(“OMHA”).4 As of 2015, it would take ten years for OMHA to 
adjudicate every case currently before it and the appeals backlog is only 
growing larger.5 
Frustrated with this delay, some providers have filed motions in the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit6 and the U.S. Court of 
 
 *  © 2017 Stephen C. Robin. 
 1. Press Release, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., CMS Announces New Recovery 
Audit Contract to Help Identify Improper Medicare Payments (Oct. 6, 2008), https://www.cms
.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Fact-Sheets/2008-Fact-Sheets-Items/2008-10-06.html 
[http://perma.cc/J48L-5ZFZ]. See generally Mary Squire, Comment, RAC: A Program in 
Distress, 2015 B.Y.U. L. REV. 291 (2015) (providing more information on the history and the 
initial negative consequences of the RAC program). 
 2. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., RECOVERY AUDITING IN MEDICARE 
FEE-FOR-SERVICE FOR FISCAL YEAR 2015, at 14 (2016), https://www.cms.gov/Research-
Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Monitoring-Programs/Medicare-FFS-Compliance-Programs
/Recovery-Audit-Program/Downloads/FY2015-Medicare-FFS-RAC-Report-to-Congress
.pdf [http://perma.cc/NU69-P55G] (reporting that the RAC program corrected $1.6 billion in 
overpayments in the 2014 fiscal year and $141 million in the 2015 fiscal year). 
 3. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HHS PRIMER: THE MEDICARE 
APPEALS PROCESS 3 (2015), https://www.hhs.gov/dab/medicare-appeals-backlog.pdf [http://
perma.cc/BMN3-BGPP]. 
 4. Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Burwell, 816 F.3d 48, 50–51 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 57 (denying jurisdiction for a hospital’s claim of mandamus to compel OMHA 
to hear its ongoing Medicare appeals). 
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Appeals for the District of Columbia7 seeking to compel OMHA to hear 
their appeals. The two circuits reached divergent conclusions due to 
different views on the enforceability of agency deadlines when 
alternative remedies are present, such as the option to escalate the claim 
to the next level of appeal.8 The Fourth Circuit viewed the appeals as 
part of a “coherent regulatory scheme,” and thus not independently 
enforceable by mandamus.9 The D.C. Circuit concluded that escalation 
is not an “adequate alternative remedy[,]” so mandamus is available.10 
To answer the question of whether the courts should enforce OMHA’s 
statutorily imposed ninety-day deadline to adjudicate each appeal, it is 
necessary to address Congress’s rationale for providing intermediate 
deadlines in the Medicare appeals system and to evaluate possible 
solutions to the current backlog. 
The D.C. Circuit’s decision to recognize the jurisdictional grounds 
for mandamus is essential to solving the problem, despite potentially 
significant consequences. Congress is pulling CMS in two separate 
directions by requiring CMS to implement the RAC program, yet failing 
to allocate funds necessary for OMHA to meet statutory appeals 
deadlines. Unless Congress increases funding, OMHA will have to 
implement one or more of the following changes: (1)	significantly 
changing the RAC program, (2)	altering the procedural rights 
guaranteed through the appeals process, or (3)	allowing the backlog to 
grow even larger. This Recent Development argues that the D.C. 
Circuit’s decision to address the Medicare appeals process as a whole, 
instead of confining its analysis to just one hospital’s rights, is necessary 
to effectuate the intent of the governing legislation and reduce the 
Medicare appeals backlog. 
Analysis proceeds in three parts. Part I explains the factors that 
must be present to allow a court to enforce an agency deadline through 
mandamus. Part I then addresses the Fourth Circuit and D.C. Circuit 
decisions, Cumberland County Hospital System, Inc. v. Burwell11 and 
American Hospital Ass’n v. Burwell.12 Part II examines common reasons 
courts avoid granting mandamus in cases of agency inaction, and then 
concludes by piecing together when and how courts should enforce 
agency deadlines, particularly when remedies such as escalation are 
 
 7. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 192 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (finding jurisdiction 
for the district court to address the equities of hospitals’ claims for mandamus).  
 8. See Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., 816 F.3d at 55; Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 192. 
 9. Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., 816 F.3d at 56 (quoting Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 
U.S. 561, 569 (1995)). 
 10. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 192; see infra Section I.D. 
 11. 816 F.3d 48 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 12. 812 F.3d 183 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
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available. Part III recommends steps each branch should take to resolve 
this issue and discusses the possible consequences from taking such 
actions. 
I.  PETITIONS FOR MANDAMUS RELIEF FROM THE MEDICARE 
APPEALS BACKLOG 
Mandamus relief compels a government agency or official to act 
when the claimant demonstrates a “clear and indisputable right to 
relief[.]”13 Both Cumberland County and American Hospital Ass’n 
involved hospital systems seeking to compel OMHA to abide by the 
statutorily imposed Medicare appeals deadlines.14 This Part provides a 
brief overview of the mandamus remedy, an outline of the multi-level 
Medicare appeals framework, and an introduction of the facts and legal 
reasoning behind both Cumberland County and American Hospital 
Ass’n. 
A. Factors Courts Consider When Evaluating Mandamus Claims 
Mandamus is a drastic remedy, “invoked only in extraordinary 
circumstances.”15 For a district court to have jurisdiction over a 
mandamus claim, the “plaintiff[] must demonstrate (1)	a clear and 
indisputable right to relief, (2)	that the government agency or official is 
violating a clear duty to act, and (3)	that no adequate alternative remedy 
exists.”16 Once those threshold requirements are met, the merits of 
mandamus are judged by the six TRAC factors, so-called because they 
were first articulated in Telecommunications Research & Action Center 
v. FCC (TRAC).17 The TRAC factors include considering the effects of 
mandamus on other agency activities and a timetable for agency action 
that is “governed by a ‘rule of reason[.]’	”18 When applied, the 
 
 13. Id. at 189 (citing United States v. Monzel, 641 F.3d 528, 532 (D.C. Cir. 2011)). 
 14. Id. at 185; Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., 816 F.3d at 49. 
 15. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 189 (quoting Power v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 781, 784 (D.C. 
Cir. 2002)). 
 16. Id. (citing United States v. Monzel, 641 F.3d 528, 532 (D.C. Cir. 2011)); see United 
States ex rel. Rahman v. Oncology Assocs., P.C., 198 F.3d 502, 511 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 17. 750 F.2d 70, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 18. Id. at 80 (quoting Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. ICC, 702 F.2d 1026, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 
1983)). The full list of TRAC factors are as follows: 
(1) the time agencies take to make decisions must be governed by a “rule of 
reason,”	.	.	.	(2) where Congress has provided a timetable or other indication of the 
speed with which it expects the agency to proceed in the enabling statute, that 
statutory scheme may supply content for this rule of reason,	.	.	.	(3) delays that might 
be reasonable in the sphere of economic regulation are less tolerable when human 
health and welfare are at stake,	.	.	.	(4) the court should consider the effect of 
expediting delayed action on agency activities of a higher or competing 
95 N.C. L. REV. 1293 (2017) 
1296 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95 
jurisdictional and equitable inquiries essentially merge, and the district 
court considers both questions at the same time.19 However, upon 
appeal, the circuit court may only address the jurisdictional issue de 
novo, while reviewing the equitable holdings for abuse of discretion.20 
B. The Medicare Appeals Process 
Medicare is the United States’ federally controlled and funded, 
single-payer health insurance plan for people age sixty-five or older, or 
people under age sixty-five with certain disabilities.21 Through Medicare, 
certified health-care providers such as hospitals and clinics apply for 
reimbursement for providing services to qualifying patients for 
qualifying procedures.22 When a provider sees a Medicare patient and 
performs a billable test or procedure, the health-care provider then 
submits a reimbursement claim to a Medicare Administrative 
Contractor (“MAC”).23 RACs review the claims initially granted by a 
MAC and revoke the claims if the test or procedure does not meet 
Medicare’s “coding or medical necessity policies.”24 If a MAC or RAC 
 
priority,	.	.	.	(5) the court should also take into account the nature and extent of the 
interests prejudiced by delay, and	.	.	.	(6) the court need not “find any impropriety 
lurking behind agency lassitude in order to hold that agency action is unreasonably 
delayed.” 
Id. (citations omitted) (first quoting Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. ICC, 702 F.2d 1026, 1034 
(D.C. Cir. 1983); then quoting Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. FDA, 740 F.2d 21, 34 
(D.C. Cir. 1984)). 
 19. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Sebelius, 686 F. Supp. 2d 55, 62 (D.D.C. 2010), rev’d on 
other grounds and remanded, 642 F.3d 1145 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 20. See, e.g., In re Medicare Reimbursement Litig., 414 F.3d 7, 10 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 21. Medicare Program—General Information, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID 
SERVS. (July 25, 2014), https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-General-Information
/MedicareGenInfo/index.html [https://perma.cc/X9GK-H39T]. 
 22. See Survey & Certification—Certification & Compliance, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & 
MEDICAID SERVS. (July 23, 2012), https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Provider-Enrollment-and-
Certification/CertificationandComplianc/index.html?redirect=/certificationandcomplianc/02_ascs
.asp [https://perma.cc/892N-453A]. 
 23. See 42 U.S.C. §§	1395f(a), 1395h(a) (2015) (detailing procedures for filing for Part A 
of Medicare, which covers hospital expenses); see also id. §§	1395n(a), 1395u(a) (detailing 
procedures for Medicare Part B, which provides medical insurance). 
 24. Press Release, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 1. Each procedure 
must be “reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of an illness or injury[.]” 
§	1395y(a)(1)(A). The controversial “Two Midnight Rule” provides an example of when 
providers can run afoul of Medicare’s coding policies, with some providers having claims 
denied for filing them under Medicare Part A for inpatient care, when CMS decided they 
should be classified as Medicare Part B for outpatient care. Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, CMS’ 
Proposed Changes to the Two-Midnight Rule: Partial Restoration of Medical Judgment, 
HEALTH AFF.: BLOG (Sept. 1, 2015), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/09/01/cms-proposed-
changes-to-the-two-midnight-rule-partial-restoration-of-medical-judgment/ [https://perma.cc
/NDU4-EHZF]. 
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denies the provider’s claim then the provider can ask for a 
redetermination by the same MAC.25 Following a second denial, the 
provider may then appeal to a Qualified Independent Contractor 
(“QIC”) for redetermination.26 The QIC must then issue a decision 
within sixty days of the appeal.27 If still unsatisfied, the health-care 
provider may then appeal to a third level of review by requesting a 
hearing from an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”).28 ALJs must 
render a decision within ninety days of the date that the provider 
requested a hearing.29 The provider may then seek a fourth level of 
review before the Departmental Appeals Board (“DAB”); the law also 
requires the DAB to either return a decision or remand the case back to 
an ALJ within ninety days.30 Similar to many final administrative 
actions, DAB decisions may be appealed to a federal district court for 
review of relevant questions of law,31 or the provider may escalate its 
claim to the district court level if the DAB misses its deadline.32 At every 
appellate stage, if HHS does not meet a deadline the provider may 
escalate its claim to the next appellate level.33 
C. Cumberland County Hospital System v. Burwell 
Neither Cumberland County nor American Hospital Ass’n 
concerned appeals to the federal courts from denied payment claims.34 
Instead, these cases involved hospital systems filing suit in federal 
district court to compel the secretary of HHS to adjudicate its appeals 
for Medicare reimbursement claims.35 In Cumberland County, the 
hospital system had 750 outstanding appeals worth $12.3 million, some 
 
 25. §	1395ff(a)(3)(A) (2014). 
 26. Id. §	1395ff(c)(1). 
 27. Id. §	1395ff(c)(3)(C)(i). 
 28. Id. §	1395ff(d)(1)(A). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. §	1395ff(d)(2)(A). 
 31. Id. §	1395ff. 
 32. Id. §	1395ff(d)(3)(B). Only after an appeal to the DAB can providers seek judicial 
review in Article III courts, and only if the amount in controversy is over $1,000. Id. 
§	1395ff(b)(2)(C), (b)(1)(E). 
 33. Id. §	1395ff(c)(3)(C)(ii), (d)(3)(A)–(B); 42 C.F.R. §§	405.1104, 405.1108(d), 
405.1132(b) (2016). To echo Judge Tatel’s apology to the reader, “We apologize to our 
readers for all of the acronyms, but this is, after all, a Medicare case, and acronyms seem 
integral to the parties’ native language.” Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 186 (D.C. 
Cir. 2016). 
 34. Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Burwell, 816 F.3d 48, 49 (4th Cir. 2016); Am. 
Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 185. 
 35. Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., 816 F.3d at 49; Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 185. 
95 N.C. L. REV. 1293 (2017) 
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of which had been awaiting assignment to an ALJ for two years.36 In a 
unanimous Fourth Circuit panel opinion authored by Judge Niemeyer, 
the court affirmed the district court’s denial of mandamus for lack of 
jurisdiction because the Medicare statute did not grant the plaintiff a 
“clear and indisputable right to the relief sought[.]”37 The court reasoned 
that when faced with a potentially long delay at the ALJ level, a health-
care provider may either escalate the claim to the DAB level or simply 
wait it out.38 The court further found that the option for escalation 
following a missed deadline indicated that Congress indeed “anticipated 
that the [ninety]-day deadline might not be met.”39 The hospital system 
argued that escalating its claim without receiving an ALJ hearing would 
act as a “waive[r of] its right to due process.”40 The hospital’s grievance 
focused on both DAB’s policy of denying a hearing unless the appeal 
presented “extraordinary question[s] of law, policy or fact[]” and on 
DAB’s remanding of each claim to the “back of [an] ever-growing ALJ 
line.”41 Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit held that the hospital system did 
not have a “clear and indisputable right” to a hearing within ninety days 
and that either CMS or Congress should rectify the unfortunate appeals 
backlog.42 
D. American Hospital Association v. Burwell 
In American Hospital Ass’n, the plaintiffs also sought mandamus to 
compel HHS to comply with the ninety-day deadline for ALJ review of 
their appeals.43 Appellants argued that escalation does not serve as an 
 
 36. Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., 816 F.3d at 50 (noting that the hospital’s claims had 
already easily surpassed the ninety-day ALJ deadline). The plaintiffs have stated that most of 
the $12.3 million in denied claims came from their inpatient rehabilitation facility, which 
already takes a much higher percentage of Medicare patients than a normal hospital. 
Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Burwell, No. 5:14-CV-508-BR, 2015 WL 1249959, at *3 
(E.D.N.C. Mar. 18, 2015); What We Do, CAPE FEAR VALLEY HEALTH FOUND., http://www
.cfvfoundation.org/whatwedo.html [http://perma.cc/AXL4-ERCK]. The $12.3 million amount 
is roughly equal to one year of revenue from that rehabilitation facility. Cumberland Cty. 
Hosp. Sys., 2015 WL 1249959, at *3. 
 37. See Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., 816 F.3d at 52 (quoting United States ex rel. Rahman 
v. Oncology Assocs., P.C., 198 F.3d 502, 511 (4th Cir. 1999)); see also discussion infra Section 
II.A. 
 38. Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., 816 F.3d at 55. 
 39. Id. 
 40. See id. 
 41. Brief for Appellant at 6, Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., 816 F.3d 48 (No. 5:14-CV-508-
BR). 
 42. Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., 816 F.3d at 52, 57 (quoting United States ex rel. Rahman 
v. Oncology Assocs., P.C., 198 F.3d 502, 511 (4th Cir. 1999)). 
 43. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 185 (D.C. Cir. 2016); Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. 
Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 43, 48 (D.D.C. 2014), rev’d and remanded, 812 F.3d 183 (D.C. Cir. 
2016). 
95 N.C. L. REV. 1293 (2017) 
2017] MEDICARE APPEALS 1299 
adequate remedy given the rarity of DAB hearings and the large 
backlog of appeals.44 Like the district court in Cumberland County,45 the 
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia denied the plaintiffs’ 
claim.46 However, on appeal, a unanimous D.C. Circuit panel reversed 
and remanded.47 The D.C. Circuit agreed with plaintiffs’ argument and 
held that escalation is not an adequate remedy to the missed deadlines, 
because DAB hearings are rare and have their own large backlogs of 
appeals as well.48 After concluding that “the statute imposes a clear duty 
on the secretary to comply with the statutory deadlines,” the D.C. 
Circuit remanded the case to the district court to balance the equities on 
whether to grant mandamus relief.49 The district court then granted 
mandamus for the plaintiffs, requiring HHS to formulate and comply 
with a plan to completely eliminate the appeals backlog by the end of 
2020, with yearly percentage benchmarks that the agency must meet 
along the way.50 If, by January 1, 2021, there are still claims that have 
been pending before ALJs for longer than one year, those claimants can 
then petition a federal court for a declaratory judgment in their favor.51 
Essentially, the two circuits disagreed on whether escalation was an 
“adequate alternative remedy” for a mandamus claim.52 The Fourth 
Circuit determined that mandamus relief was precluded by the 
availability of escalation,53 whereas the D.C. Circuit concluded that 
escalation was not an adequate remedy for missed deadlines.54 While 
courts may treat the equities of enforcing agency deadlines differently, 
escalation should not be considered an adequate alternative remedy in 
the Medicare appeals context.55 
 
 44. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 191. 
 45. Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Burwell, No. 5:14-CV-508-BR, 2015 WL 1249959, 
at *10 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 18, 2015)  
 46. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 76 F. Supp. 3d at 56. 
 47. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 183. 
 48. Id. at 191. 
 49. Id. at 192. 
 50. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, No. 1:14-CV-00851, 2016 WL 7076983, at *3 (D.D.C. 
Dec. 5, 2016). 
 51. Id. Although the consequence for failure to reach this 2021 goal is rather significant, 
there are no apparent consequences if HHS fails to meet the yearly percentage goals. Id. 
 52. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 192; see Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Burwell, 
816 F.3d 48, 56 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 53. Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., 816 F.3d at 56. 
 54. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 192. 
 55. See infra Section II.B. 
95 N.C. L. REV. 1293 (2017) 
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II.  TESTS AND REASONS BEHIND JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE DEADLINES 
As stated before, mandamus is a drastic remedy, “invoked only in 
extraordinary circumstances.”56 Even when a plaintiff proves mandamus 
jurisdiction, courts have been reluctant to grant mandamus relief.57 
Typically, they do not want to interfere with an agency’s prioritization of 
limited resources or simply move one petitioner to the front of the 
line—at the expense of others.58 Section A describes how courts have 
treated mandamus claims in the agency delay context. Section B 
concludes that mandamus is appropriate for hospitals awaiting their 
appeals, because of the “systemic failure” of the Medicare appeals 
system. 
A. Justifications Courts Use to Enforce or Decline to Enforce Agency 
Deadlines via Mandamus 
Courts justify refusal to compel agency action because they are 
generally unwilling to interfere with an agency’s prioritization of its 
limited resources.59 If a plaintiff overcomes the jurisdictional bar to 
mandamus, courts will often still find judicial enforcement of a deadline 
to be inequitable.60 For instance, in In re Barr Laboratories, Inc.,61 Barr, 
a drug manufacturer, sought to compel the Food and Drug 
 
 56. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 189 (quoting Power v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 781, 784 (D.C. 
Cir. 2002)). 
 57. See infra Section II.A. 
 58. See infra Section II.A. 
 59. See Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council, Inc. v. Norton, 336 F.3d 1094, 1101 (D.C. 
Cir. 2003) (“[T]he district court erred by disregarding the importance of there being 
‘competing priorities’ for limited resources.”); In re Barr Labs., Inc., 930 F.2d 72, 76 (D.C. Cir. 
1991). 
 60. See, e.g., Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council, 336 F.3d at 1101–02; In re Barr Labs., 
930 F.2d at 76; In re Monroe Commc’ns Corp., 840 F.2d 942, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The court in 
Cumberland County cited a Fourth Circuit case for the mandamus relief standard. See 
Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Burwell, 816 F.3d 48, 52 (4th Cir. 2016) (citing United 
States ex rel. Rahman v. Oncology Assocs., P.C., 198 F.3d 502, 511 (4th Cir. 1999)). Notably, 
the court in Cumberland County relied on In re Barr Laboratories from the D.C. Circuit. See 
id. at 56 (citing In re Barr Labs., 930 F.2d at 74–75). The D.C. Circuit occupies a uniquely 
important place in administrative law, because most federal agencies are located within its 
jurisdiction. See generally Eric M. Fraser et al., The Jurisdiction of the D.C. Circuit, 23 
CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 131 (2013) (examining the different causes for the D.C. Circuit’s 
unique caseload, such as special treatment by Congress and geographic factors); John G. 
Roberts, Jr., Lecture, What Makes the D.C. Circuit Different? A Historical View, 92 VA. L. 
REV. 375 (2006) (summarizing the history of the D.C. Circuit); Patricia M. Wald et al., The 
Contribution of the D.C. Circuit to Administrative Law, 40 ADMIN. L. REV. 507 (1988) 
(chronicling the many instances throughout history when the D.C. Circuit substantially 
affected the state of administrative law). 
 61. 930 F.2d 72 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
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Administration (“FDA”) to comply with a 180-day deadline for 
approving Barr’s generic drug application.62 Although FDA admittedly 
violated the statutory deadline, the D.C. Circuit refused to grant 
mandamus.63 The court reasoned that granting mandamus would place 
Barr “at the head of the queue[,] simply mov[ing] all others back one 
space and produc[ing] no net gain.”64 Instead of a judicial order, the 
court suggested legislative or administrative action: Congress could 
earmark more funds for FDA or FDA could simplify the review 
process.65 
In another D.C. Circuit case, the court chose to afford the Federal 
Communications Commission (“FCC”) “great latitude” despite ongoing 
delay.66 In re Monroe Communications Corp.67 involved a competing 
television licensee applicant attempting to compel the FCC to decide 
whether the current licensee had broadcast obscene material.68 
Recognizing the FCC’s authority to set its own agenda, the court refused 
to address arguments that the FCC had resolved other actions sooner 
than the petitioner’s.69 The court further found that the issue was “a 
delicate one, requiring the FCC to balance policy and constitutional 
concerns,” which contributed to the court’s reluctance to compel agency 
adjudication.70 Therefore, courts refuse to grant mandamus for agency 
delay on either separation-of-powers grounds71 or due to an 
unwillingness to rush particularly complex agency decisions.72 
 
 62. Id. at 73–74. To put the deadline violation in context, FDA took roughly double the 
allotted time for most applications, and up to quadruple the allotted time for certain 
applications. Id. at 74. In contrast, the most recent HHS report showed an average wait time 
of 877 days for an ALJ hearing, almost ten times the statutory deadline. See Average 
Processing Time by Fiscal Year, DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Nov. 18, 2016), https://www
.hhs.gov/about/agencies/omha/about/current-workload/average-processing-time-by-fiscal-year
/index.html [http://perma.cc/8QCU-Z349]. 
 63. In re Barr Labs., 930 F.2d at 76. 
 64. Id. at 75. For another case justifying a denial of mandamus in order to thwart line-
jumping, see Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council, 336 F.3d at 1101. 
 65. In re Barr Labs., 930 F.2d at 76. 
 66. In re Monroe Commc’ns Corp., 840 F.2d 942, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Although the FCC 
was not subject to any firm deadlines, the proceedings had well eclipsed the suggested 
timelines given in the statute and Senate reports. Id. at 945. 
 67. 840 F.2d 942 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
 68. Id. at 943–44. 
 69. Id. at 946 (“Further, we must give agencies great latitude in determining their 
agendas	.	.	.	.”); see also Med. Comm. For Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 674–75 (D.C. 
Cir. 1970) (giving the SEC substantial deference for setting its agenda), vacated, 404 U.S. 403 
(1972). 
 70. In re Monroe Commc’ns, 840 F.2d at 946. 
 71. See Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council, Inc. v. Norton, 336 F.3d 1094, 1101 (D.C. 
Cir. 2003); In re Barr Labs., Inc., 930 F.2d 72, 76 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
 72. See In re Monroe Commc’ns, 840 F.2d at 946; Orion Reserves Ltd. P’ship v. 
Kempthorne, 516 F. Supp. 2d 8, 15–17 (D.D.C. 2007) (ruling that the Bureau of Land 
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Courts have, however, granted mandamus in some circumstances, 
but each case involves a very fact-intensive inquiry. If there is a showing 
of bias or impropriety, then courts are more willing to grant 
mandamus.73 Absent any bias in the administrative delay, courts are 
reluctant to intervene unless the administrative systems are significantly 
failing to function as Congress intended74 or are failing to follow a 
previous court order.75 
For example, in Air Line Pilots Ass’n v. Civil Aeronautics Board,76 
the D.C. Circuit mandated that the Civil Aeronautics Board (“CAB”) 
hear cases that had been pending before it for five years.77 The Airline 
Deregulation Act of 1978 required CAB to provide unemployment 
benefits to airline employees who were laid off as a result of the major 
regulatory changes CAB enacted.78 In the Act’s five-year history, CAB 
held only one hearing and did not issue any dispositions.79 The court 
decided that this delay was unreasonable and required CAB to “report 
to [the D.C. Circuit] on its progress in these cases every [thirty] days[.]”80 
 
Management’s nine-year delay in processing Orion’s oil shale mining claims was not 
unreasonable, given the substantial amount of work required to process each claim); see also 
Eric Biber, The Importance of Resource Allocation in Administrative Law, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 
1, 19 (2008) (“[C]ourts might well conclude that	.	.	.	they are just not well suited to the task of 
regularly supervising and monitoring large organizations.”). 
 73. See, e.g., Sandoz, Inc. v. Leavitt, 427 F. Supp. 2d 29, 39–40 (D.D.C. 2006). In a factual 
pattern almost identical to that in In re Barr Labs., the court granted mandamus for a generic 
drug application because plaintiff drug manufacturer showed that the agency may have 
singled them out and that expediting their application would not adversely affect any other 
drug applications. Id.; see In re Barr Labs., 930 F.2d at 76 (“Where the agency has manifested 
bad faith, as by singling someone out for bad treatment or asserting utter indifference to a 
congressional deadline, the agency will have a hard time claiming legitimacy for its 
priorities.”). 
 74. See Air Line Pilots Ass’n Int’l v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 750 F.2d 81, 85–86 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) (holding that “claims of unreasonable delay fall within a narrow class of interlocutory 
appeals from agency action over which we appropriately should exercise our jurisdiction” and 
requiring the agency report its progress in reviewing a backlog of wrongful termination 
complaints to the court every thirty days). 
 75. See In re People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran, 680 F.3d 832, 838 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (holding 
it will grant mandamus if the Secretary of State did not issue the reasoning behind a decision, 
which the D.C. Circuit had ordered two years prior, within four months); In re Core 
Commc’ns, 531 F.3d 849, 861–62 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (granting mandamus for the FCC’s seven-
year delay in responding to a court order, requiring the agency to rescind and replace an old 
rule). 
 76. 750 F.2d 81 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 77. Id. at 86–87. 
 78. See Airline Deregulation Act, Pub. L. No. 95-504, §	43, 92 Stat. 1705, 1750–53 (1978) 
(codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §	1371) (requiring the CAB to provide benefits to 
employees whose employment was terminated due to the other regulatory changes enacted in 
the Airline Deregulation Act). 
 79. Air Line Pilots Ass’n Int’l, 750 F.2d at 85. 
 80. Id. at 88–89. 
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Here, the court focused on the unreasonable delays felt by all claimants, 
and not just the delays felt by the plaintiff, as the Barr Laboratories 
court did.81 In shifting its focus from one claimant to the whole system, 
the court disregarded the common line-jumping or resource allocation 
arguments. In effect, the court’s mandamus order simply addressed the 
unreasonable delays felt by all of the potential parties with claims under 
the Act in question. In doing so, the court avoided the separation of 
powers and complex agency decisions issues highlighted above.  
B. Applying Mandamus to Agency Deadlines 
The escalation provision, which is unique to Medicare appeals, 
separates this system from those involved in the bulk of other 
mandamus cases regarding agency delay.82 In the absence of an 
escalation provision, a person or organization delayed beyond an agency 
deadline has no formal recourse; the only recourse is to wait.83 However, 
in the Medicare appeals context, statutes permit providers to escalate 
their claim to the next level.84 The Fourth Circuit and D.C. Circuit 
disagreed on the role that the escalation option plays in the mandamus 
analysis: the Fourth Circuit viewed escalation as part of a “coherent 
regulatory scheme” that must be interpreted in context;85 the D.C. 
Circuit held that escalation is an “inadequate” alternative remedy.86 
Nonetheless, neither opinion sufficiently explains what makes a remedy 
adequate, or what effect a “coherent regulatory scheme” has on the 
availability of mandamus relief.87 
These two opinions reflect the state of federal mandamus 
jurisprudence. Federal courts have denied mandamus jurisdiction in 
cases where there was a clear alternative method available to accomplish 
 
 81. Id.; In re Barr Labs., Inc., 930 F.2d 72, 74 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
 82. See, e.g., In re Core Commc’ns, 531 F.3d 849, 858–60 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (granting 
mandamus to compel the FCC to comply with a previous mandamus order granted seven 
years prior); In re United Mine Workers of Am. Int’l Union, 190 F.3d 545, 550 (D.C. Cir. 
1999) (remarking that the Mine Safety and Health Administration had a rule pending final 
decision for eight years after the comment period ended); In re Barr Labs., 930 F.2d at 74 
(noting that FDA simply has a 180-day deadline to issue a decision for drug applications, 
without giving applicants any other recourse). 
 83. See In re Barr Labs., 930 F.2d at 74. 
 84. See supra Section I.B. 
 85. See Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Burwell, 816 F.3d 48, 52, 56 (4th Cir. 2016) 
(quoting Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 569 (1995)). 
 86. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 192 (D.C. Cir. 2016). The court does note 
that, although the availability of escalation does not preclude mandamus jurisdiction, it could 
weigh against mandamus when addressing the equities. Id. 
 87. Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., 816 F.3d at 56 (quoting Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 
U.S. 561, 569 (1995)). 
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the same result sought by mandamus.88 The Supreme Court has held that 
even “costly and inconvenient” alternative remedies can preclude 
mandamus relief.89 If the substantive right sought by the mandamus 
action is available through an alternative means, then mandamus is 
generally unavailable.90 Federal courts have not substantially developed 
the “adequate” prong of the phrase “adequate alternative remed[ies]”;91 
indeed, they seem more focused on whether the remedy actually 
safeguards the substantive right instead of worrying whether any 
procedural rights were lost as a result of the alternative remedy.92 
In the Medicare appeals context, the option to escalate a claim 
presents a unique problem for the “adequate alternative remedy” 
analysis.93 American Hospital Ass’n turned on the “systemic failure” of 
the Medicare appeals system that “causes virtually all appeals to be 
decided well after the statutory deadlines.”94 Judge Tatel acknowledged 
that “in isolated or occasional cases,” escalation could serve as an 
adequate alternative remedy, and that its inclusion “indicate[d] that 
Congress anticipated that [delay] might occur with some measure of 
regularity.”95 However, the opinion concluded that escalating to the 
DAB would be an inadequate remedy in this situation, due to the 
DAB’s own significant backlog and its discretionary review of cases.96 
 
 88. Mukand Int’l, Ltd. v. United States, 502 F.3d 1366, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (noting that 
the plaintiff could have sought “similar injunctive relief”); Power v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 781, 
784 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (noting that the fee petition process was an adequate alternative method 
for seeking remedy); Barnhart v. Devine, 771 F.2d 1515, 1524 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (noting that 
appellants “should have sought recourse through the Office of Special Counsel”). 
 89. Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass’n, 319 U.S. 21, 30 (1943) (holding that mandamus 
could not be used to require a district court judge to reinstate a plea in abatement, even 
though the petitioners would have to complete the underlying trial before being able to 
appeal the abatement). 
 90. See In re al-Nashiri, 791 F.3d 71, 78 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Power, 292 F.3d at 787. 
 91. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 189. 
 92. See United States ex rel. Girard Tr. Co. v. Helvering, 301 U.S. 540, 544 (1937) (“[T]he 
writ of mandamus may not be employed to secure the adjudication of a disputed right for 
which an ordinary suit affords a remedy equally adequate, and complete.”); Carter v. 
Seamans, 411 F.2d 767, 773 (5th Cir. 1969) (“[T]he alternative remedy must be adequate, i.e., 
capable of affording full relief as to the very subject matter in question.”). State mandamus 
jurisprudence has provided more robust guarantees in procedural rights through mandamus. 
See Southern LNG, Inc. v. MacGinnitie, 755 S.E.2d 683, 685 (Ga. 2014) (“[The] alternative 
legal remedy must be ‘equally convenient, complete and beneficial’ to the petitioner.” 
(quoting N. Fulton Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Roach, 453 S.E.2d 463, 466 (Ga. 1995))); In re Prudential 
Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 136 (Tex. 2004) (granting mandamus when necessary to 
“preserve important substantive and procedural rights from impairment or loss”). 
 93. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 189. 
 94. Id. at 191. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 192. 
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This line of reasoning introduces a seemingly equitable consideration 
into a decision that is supposed to be strictly legal in nature.97 
Mandamus relief is an “extraordinary remedy[.]”98 While courts are 
reluctant to grant mandamus for agency inaction in cases involving an 
agency’s resource allocation decisions or particularly difficult questions, 
courts have found mandamus jurisdiction in cases involving a “systemic 
failure” of the agency to operate as Congress intended.99 This systemic 
failure occurs when insufficient funding completely overburdens the 
alternative remedies otherwise available.100 If a “systemic failure” 
occurs, fixing that failure requires much more than a judicial writ; it 
requires two, or all three, branches of the government to work to solve 
the problem at hand.101 
III.  POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE MEDICARE APPEALS BACKLOG 
All parties involved in Cumberland County102 and American 
Hospital Ass’n103 agree that the Medicare appeals backlog problem poses 
a “heavy financial burden” for providers104 and places “the 
administrative process” in “grave condition.”105 To fix such a wide-
reaching problem, multiple branches of the federal government must 
play significant roles in restructuring the overburdened administrative 
system. This Part identifies steps available to each branch of government 
for reducing backlogged Medicare appeals and considers their potential 
consequences. 
Section A explains that Congress is in the best position to fix the 
backlog, through providing more funding for OMHA or by restructuring 
 
 97. Id. at 189–90; see supra Section I.A. This reasoning, of course, passes over the 
important question of how to identify a “systemic failure[.]” Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 191. 
It is fair to assume, for the purposes of this problem, that an average delay of almost ten times 
the statutory deadline constitutes a “systemic failure[.]” Id. 
 98. In re People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran, 680 F.3d 832, 836 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting In 
re Core Commc’ns, 531 F.3d 849, 855 (D.C. Cir. 2008)); Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr. 
v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 78 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Burwell, 816 
F.3d 48, 52 (4th Cir. 2016); Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 189. 
 99. See supra Section II.B. 
 100. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 191. 
 101. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, No. 1:14-CV-00851, 2016 WL 5106997, at *8 (D.D.C. 
Sept. 19, 2016) (“The Court, however, does not possess a magic wand that, when waved, will 
eliminate the backlog.”). 
 102. Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Burwell, No. 5:14-CV-508-BR, 2015 WL 1249959 
(E.D.N.C. Mar. 18, 2015). 
 103. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, No. 1:14-CV-00851, 2016 WL 5106997 (D.D.C. Sept. 19, 
2016). 
 104. Cumberland Cty., 2015 WL 1249959, at *10; see Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 2016 WL 5106997, 
at *4. 
 105. Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., 816 F.3d at 57. 
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the appeals framework. Congressional action may be ineffectual, 
however, due to the political pressures that may slow its response. 
Section B addresses HHS’s role in the backlog and concludes that the 
agency cannot entirely fix the backlog on its own. Section C addresses 
the role of the judiciary: mandamus should only be granted in the most 
egregious circumstances of agency delay. This Part concludes that the 
D.C. district court was correct in granting mandamus, because Congress 
demonstrated its inability or unwillingness to act and HHS failed to 
uphold the Medicare appeals system as envisioned by Congress.106 
A. Legislative Action 
To ensure providers’ procedural rights are enforced through the 
appeals process without diminishing the scope or effectiveness of the 
RAC program, Congress should increase funding for OMHA and ALJ 
appeals. Congress contributed to this problem by requiring CMS to 
implement the RAC program without significantly increasing OMHA 
funding, and Congress is therefore in a good position to remedy the 
shortfall.107 With increased funding, OMHA could hire more ALJs to 
decrease the backlog at a much faster rate. If Congress fails to increase 
OMHA funding, HHS will have to take drastic action, significantly 
altering both its appeals process and the RAC program.108 Alternatively, 
Congress could alleviate the appeals backlog by altering the nature of 
the appeals process or the RAC program itself. 
Even though congressional action is the most desirable solution, 
significant legislative reform seems unlikely.109 In September 2016, the 
D.C. district court denied the government’s motion for a stay due to its 
serious doubts that any legislative fix was forthcoming.110 HHS argued 
that the President’s proposed budget for fiscal year (“FY”) 2017, along 
with the proposed Audit & Appeals Fairness, Integrity, and Reforms in 
 
 106. See infra Section III.C. 
 107. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 3, at 6. OMHA’s 
appropriations have increased from $72 million to $82 million from fiscal year (“FY”) 2012 to 
FY 2014, while the number of appeals have increased from 117,068 in FY 2012 to 474,063 in 
FY 2014. Id. The amount of overpayments collected by RACs, and concurrently the number 
of appeals, decreased significantly in FY 2015, largely due to HHS’s decision to temporarily 
prohibit RACs from performing inpatient hospital patient status reviews, where the RAC 
reviews whether a patient should be considered inpatient or outpatient. See CTRS. FOR 
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 2, at v. Even with this sharp reduction, the ALJ 
level of appeals still received twice as many appeals as it processed in FY 2015. U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 3, at 4. 
 108. See infra Section III.B. 
 109. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, No. 1:14-CV-00851, 2016 WL 5106997, at *7 (D.D.C. 
Sept. 19, 2016). 
 110. Id. at *8. 
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Medicare Act (“AFIRM Act”), would alleviate much of the backlog 
without any drastic agency action necessary.111 However, the court 
declined to give the possibility of any legislation much weight in its 
analysis.112 In Congress’s FY 2017 proposed budget, the Senate version 
would increase OMHA’s budget by $5 million—only a 5% increase from 
the previous year—even though OMHA requested a $143 million 
increase in order to combat the backlog.113 Similarly, the budget 
proposal from the House of Representatives did not include any 
increase in OMHA funding.114 The AFIRM Act, which would have 
created a new class of “Medicare Magistrates” to assist appeals, did not 
move beyond the Senate Finance Committee after it was introduced in 
December 2015.115 
All of this underscores the unreliability of depending on 
congressional action to solve serious agency problems. Relying on 
legislative funding to honor administrative deadlines can be difficult 
because the coalition that passed the legislation to begin with may be 
stripped of power or otherwise dissolved over time.116 For a relatively 
nonpartisan issue like Medicare appeals, this may not appear to pose a 
threat to congressional enforcement. However, the RAC program’s 
implementation and the exponential rise in appeals also coincidentally 
occurred during what, by some metrics, were two of the most 
unproductive congressional sessions in this country’s recent history.117 In 
both district court cases for Cumberland County and American Hospital 
 
 111. Id. at *7; see Audit & Appeals Fairness, Integrity, and Reforms in Medicare Act of 
2015, S. 2368, 114th Cong., at 1 (2015) (stating that the purpose of the bill is “to improve the 
efficiency of the Medicare appeals process”); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE 
OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT: FISCAL YEAR 2017, at 138 (2016), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2017/assets/budget.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DA9A-5ZKN]. 
 112. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 2016 WL 5106997, at *7–8. 
 113. See S. 3040, 114th Cong., at 82 (2016); HHS FY 2017 Budget in Brief—OMHA, U.S. 
DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/about/budget/fy2017/budget-in-brief
/omha/index.html [http://perma.cc/6XSE-38ZW]. 
 114. See H.R. 5926, 114th Cong., at 82 (2016). 
 115. See Audit & Appeals Fairness, Integrity, and Reforms in Medicare Act of 2015, S. 
2368, 114th Cong., at 4 (2015); Audit & Appeals Fairness, Integrity, and Reforms in Medicare 
Act of 2015: Introduction to S. 2368 Before the S. Fin. Comm., 114th Cong. (Dec. 8, 2015). 
 116. See Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative 
Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 245 (1983). 
 117. See Cristina Marcos & Ramsey Cox, Historically Unproductive Congress Ends, HILL 
(Dec. 16, 2014), http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/senate/227365-historically-unproductive-
congress-ends [http://perma.cc/XA8S-ZRNL]. But see Glenn Kessler, Harry Reid’s Claim 
That the Current Senate Is “the Most Unproductive” in U.S. History, WASH. POST: FACT 
CHECKER (Dec. 8, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2015/12/08
/harry-reids-claim-that-the-current-senate-is-the-most-unproductive-in-u-s-history/ [http://
perma.cc/J7WD-26J2]. 
95 N.C. L. REV. 1293 (2017) 
1308 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95 
Ass’n, which addressed the appeals backlog from late 2014 and early 
2015, the courts recognized that Congress was aware of the problem and 
was working to address it.118 In the two years since the first opinion, 
Congress has yet to increase funding or to alter the structure of the 
Medicare appeals process in any way.119 Clearly, Congress failed to 
adequately respond to backlogged Medicare appeals. Because of 
congressional inaction, OMHA remains “in an untenable position” 
created by the confluence of increased appeals and stagnant funding.120 
B. Agency Action 
If Congress will not act, then HHS must take corrective measures to 
comply with the statutory framework. To HHS’s credit, the agency 
implemented several steps to address the backlog during the course of 
the American Hospital Ass’n litigation, such as offering to settle any 
pending appeals for sixty-six percent of the amount of the claims121 and 
proposing a system to evaluate and incentivize each RAC based on an 
accuracy score.122 However, in the D.C. district court’s denial of HHS’s 
motion for a year-long stay, Judge Boasberg determined that the 
proposed administrative changes would not make any “significant 
progress toward a solution.”123 Although the proposed increase in 
settlements, introduction of alternative adjudicatory procedures, and 
alterations to the RAC program would result in fifty percent fewer 
backlogged OMHA appeals by FY 2020 than if HHS had taken no 
action, these changes would not affect the hundreds of thousands of 
appeals that are already backlogged.124 Moreover, one of the proposed 
changes, requiring prior authorization for certain items or services, 
would actually impose new procedural hurdles for providers.125 
HHS’s inability to propose meaningful and significant changes 
underscores the primary limitation of relying on only agency action: the 
constraints placed on the agency by Congress restrict its ability to make 
drastic and wholesale changes in agency procedure. Although HHS’s 
 
 118. Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Burwell, No. 5:14-CV-508-BR, 2015 WL 1249959, 
at *9 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 18, 2015); Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 43, 55 (D.D.C. 
2014), rev’d and remanded, 812 F.3d 183 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 119. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, No. 1:14-CV-00851, 2016 WL 5106997, at *7 (D.D.C. 
Sept. 19, 2016). 
 120. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 187 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 121. Supplemental Declaration of Ellen Murray at 8, Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, __ F. 
Supp. 3d __ (D.D.C. Nov. 7, 2016) (No. 1:14-CV-00851), 2016 WL 5106997. 
 122. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 2, at 10. 
 123. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 2016 WL 5106997, at *6. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See id. 
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proposed changes did not extend to the outer boundaries of its statutory 
constraints,126 any further changes may compromise the integrity of the 
appeals process or RAC program and would likely contravene the 
congressional intent of curbing Medicare overpayments.127 
HHS argues that it is unable to satisfy these two competing 
interests: guaranteeing certain procedural rights for providers’ appeals 
on one hand128 and implementing the RAC program to reduce Medicare 
overpayments on the other.129 Although it would be preferable from a 
principal-agent perspective for the agency to wait to receive guidance 
from Congress on how to balance those competing priorities,130 HHS 
may be able to infer congressional intent based on the amount of 
procedural requirements in place under both statutory mandates. While 
Congress has provided explicit procedural rights by including deadlines 
for each level of appeal,131 the RAC statute provides HHS with much 
more discretion to determine its scope.132 Therefore, in this context, 
HHS should ensure that the Medicare appeals process meets its 
 
 126. See 42 U.S.C. §	1395ddd(h) (2015); Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 2016 WL 5106997, at *7. The 
American Hospital Association, in its motion for summary judgment, proposed that the 
secretary implement harsher penalties on RACs with high reversal rates and shortening the 
“lookback period” during which RACs can review payments. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment & Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Support at 10–11, Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. 
Burwell, __ F. Supp. 3d __ (D.D.C. Oct. 14, 2016) (No. 1:14-CV-00851), 2016 WL 5106997. 
Both of those proposals would fit within the statutory constraints of the RAC program. See 
§	1395ddd(h)(1) (mandating that the secretary “enter into contracts” with RACs under the 
Medicare Integrity Program); §	13955ddd(h)(4) (limiting the lookback period to no more than 
four years prior). 
 127. See §	1395ddd(h)(1) (instructing the HHS secretary to enter into contracts with 
recovery audit contractors to “recoup[] overpayments” made for all Medicare programs). 
 128. See supra Section I.B. In its briefs throughout the entire litigation against American 
Hospital Association, HHS has stressed the difficulty of its task to reduce the backlog without 
congressional support. See, e.g., Brief for the Appellee at 17, Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 
F.3d 183 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (No. 15-5015) (“Congress has not provided the resources needed to 
adjudicate claims within the timetable contemplated by the Medicare statute. Several 
members of Congress have explicitly recognized that this is the case, and plaintiffs do not 
seriously contend otherwise.”). The agency raised an argument of impossibility in its motion 
for the D.C. district court to reconsider granting mandamus. Defendant’s Motion for 
Reconsideration & Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Support at 2, Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. 
Burwell, __ F. Supp. 3d __ (D.D.C. Dec. 15, 2016) (No. 1:14-CV-00851), 2016 WL 5106997. 
 129. See §	1395ddd(h)(1); Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 186. 
 130. See generally Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio, Agency Delays: How A Principal-Agent 
Approach Can Inform Judicial and Executive Branch Review of Agency Foot-Dragging, 79 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1381 (2011) (examining the treatment of agency delay by the judicial 
and executive branches from a principal-agent approach). 
 131. §	1395ff(a)(2), (c)(3)(C), (d)(1)(A), (d)(2)(A). 
 132. See id. §	1395ddd(h)(1) (“[T]he Secretary shall enter into contracts with recovery 
audit contractors in accordance with this subsection for the purpose of identifying 
underpayments and overpayments and recouping overpayments	.	.	.	.”). 
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statutory minimum requirements before HHS continues to operate the 
RAC program beyond its legally required minimum. 
However, although HHS has more clear responsibilities regarding 
the appeals process, there are also clearer opportunities for enforcement 
of those responsibilities, as seen in the recent litigation.133 Judicial review 
of deadlines is much easier to obtain than substantive review of the 
scope of an agency’s adoption of a certain program.134 A plaintiff who 
wished to challenge the underimplementation of the RAC program 
would likely face standing problems in federal court.135 Therefore, the 
only possible protection for the RAC program would be congressional 
action, which can be unreliable given the current political state.136 
Although extrapolating congressional intent from the constraints put on 
agency discretion can be a useful tool, Congress clearly intended the 
RAC program to encompass more than just a token collection of 
contractors to meet the statutory minimum requirements.137 Therefore, 
given the difficulty of enforcing congressional intent for the RAC 
program, it is important to maintain the efficacy of the RAC program as 
much as possible while emphasizing the statutory guarantees afforded to 
providers through the Medicare appeals system. 
C. Judicial Action 
The most crucial step for a mandamus claim against agency inaction 
is deciding whether to address the rights of only the plaintiffs or the 
rights of all participants in the administrative system. The Fourth Circuit 
focused on the resource allocation problem, reasoning that this problem 
would best be solved by “the political branches[,]” and therefore denied 
 
 133. See supra Section II.B. 
 134. See Jacob E. Gersen & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Deadlines in Administrative Law, 
156 U. PA. L. REV. 923, 932 (2008). 
 135. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500–01 (1975). A plaintiff challenging the 
underimplementation of the RAC program would not likely satisfy standing requirements for 
a “distinct and palpable injury[.]” See id. at 501. The only group of possible litigants who could 
be injured by the underimplementation of the RAC program would be health-care providers, 
since RACs are tasked with finding underpayments as well as overpayments. §	1395ddd(h)(1). 
Given the unpopularity of the RAC program among most health-care providers, it is highly 
unlikely that any provider would actually file suit. See Bob Herman, RACs Recouped $3B for 
Medicare in 2013, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Sept. 29, 2014), http://www
.modernhealthcare.com/article/20140929/NEWS/309299939 [https://perma.cc/9LMJ-TBZX] 
(reporting the high overturn rates for RACs in 2013). 
 136. See supra Section III.A. 
 137. See Press Release, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 1 (announcing 
Congress’s expansion of the three-year, six-state RAC pilot program to all fifty states). 
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mandamus to the hospital plaintiff.138 In contrast, the D.C. Circuit 
treated this case as a suit against the Medicare appeals process in 
general, rather than one in favor of just one or a few hospitals, as the 
Fourth Circuit did.139 This shift in focus allowed the D.C. Circuit, and the 
district court on remand, to concentrate on the statutory obligations of 
HHS as a whole rather than confining their analyses to the status of one 
hospital’s appeals. 
Courts should allow Congress the opportunity to fix systemic 
Medicare appeals backlogs, especially if Congress has indicated its intent 
to do so.140 Courts recognize that Congress is much better equipped than 
the judiciary to reshape an entire administrative procedural system, such 
as the Medicare appeals process, and therefore courts aim to give 
Congress proper deference.141 The district court for the District of 
Columbia afforded Congress an appropriate amount of deference: in its 
2014 denial of mandamus, the court viewed the possibility of 
congressional action as a factor weighing against mandamus.142 Two 
years later, the court more pessimistically noted that “Congress is 
unlikely to play the role of the cavalry here, riding to the rescue of the 
Secretary’s besieged program.”143 The prospect of congressional action 
only remains a compelling factor for mandamus as long as Congress 
appears willing and able to address the underlying problem.144 However, 
once Congress is clearly unwilling or unable to make corrective changes, 
courts should affirmatively enforce statutory rights.145 
Although judicial enforcement can be a powerful force when 
utilized, it sometimes suffers from procedural delays typically 
 
 138. Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Burwell, 816 F.3d 48, 57 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting 
Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Burwell, No. 5:14-CV-508-BR, 2015 WL 1249959, at *10 
(E.D.N.C. Mar. 18, 2015)); see supra Section I.C. 
 139. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 192 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he complaint 
also requests the broader relief of ‘requiring HHS to otherwise comply with its statutory 
obligations in administering the appeals process for all hospitals.’	”) 
 140. See, e.g., Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 43, 55 (D.D.C. 2014) (noting that 
“Congress is aware of the inundation of appeals”), rev’d and remanded, 812 F.3d 183 (D.C. 
Cir. 2016). 
 141. See Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 130, at 1431. 
 142. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 76 F. Supp. 3d at 55. 
 143. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, No. 1:14-CV-00851, 2016 WL 5106997, at *8 (D.D.C. 
Sept. 19, 2016). 
 144. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 193 (“[T]he clarity of the statutory duty likely will 
require issuance of the writ if the political branches have failed to make meaningful progress 
within a reasonable period of time	.	.	.	.”); Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 2016 WL 5106997, at *4 (“[T]he 
force of Congress’s knowledge and ability to act as a reason to deny mandamus diminishes 
with the passage of time absent meaningful legislative action, particularly as the backlog and 
delays have worsened.”). 
 145. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 147 (1803) (“[E]very right, when 
withheld, must have a remedy	.	.	.	.”). 
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experienced by the other political branches.146 As noted by 
commentators, “[t]he [federal] judiciary is not known for its expeditious 
decisionmaking[,]”147 even though it is generally insulated from political 
pressures that can delay the other two branches.148 In American Hospital 
Ass’n, for example, the D.C. district court granted mandamus in 
December 2016, two and a half years after the plaintiffs filed their 
complaint.149 Waiting two and a half years for relief would not be 
considered particularly expedient, especially considering some hospitals 
had approximately one year’s worth of revenues tied up in the appeals 
process.150 However, because the court was separated from the even-
slower Congress, Judge Boasberg was able to grant mandamus to begin 
to quell the Medicare appeals backlog.151 
In addition to some procedural slowness, the remedies available to 
the courts are much more limited than those available to the other 
branches of government.152 Courts can issue writs of mandamus, 
prescribe new judicial deadlines, or simply order that an agency “act 
expeditiously.”153 In its mandamus order, the D.C. district court imposed 
a timetable that requires HHS to decrease the backlog by a certain 
percentage each year.154 Although the court will be able to enter default 
judgments for claims still significantly backlogged after 2020, there are 
no penalties if HHS does not meet each yearly goal.155 This serves as a 
perfect example of the courts’ role in enforcing administrative deadlines: 
after years of hard-fought litigation, the final judicial order is only a part 
of the overall solution. The judicial branch may not have the flexibility 
or responsiveness of the political branches, but it serves as a vital 
backstop to enforce administrative deadlines and guarantee procedural 
rights to those interacting with the administrative state. 
 
 146. Professor Sant’Ambrogio views judicial enforcement of an agency’s statutory 
responsibilities as “[a] core responsibility of the judiciary.” See Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 
130, at 1431. 
 147. Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 130, at 1430. Nationwide, fourteen percent of civil district 
court cases have been pending for at least three years. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. 
COURTS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS—FEDERAL COURT MANAGEMENT 
STATISTICS 1 (June 30, 2016), http://www.uscourts.gov/file/20172/download [http://perma.cc
/8S5T-STS9]. 
 148. Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 130, at 1430. 
 149. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, No. 1:14-CV-00851, 2016 WL 7076983, at *1 (D.D.C. 
Dec. 5, 2016). 
 150. See supra Section I.C. 
 151. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 2016 WL 7076983, at *3. 
 152. Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 130, at 1431. 
 153. Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 134, at 964–66. 
 154. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 2016 WL 7076983, at *3. 
 155. Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
Administrative procedure is viewed by scholars as a way for 
congressional coalitions to exert lasting power over agency action.156 The 
coalition that enacted the Medicare appeals framework included 
deadlines to guarantee providers a baseline for procedural rights. 
However, just as a competing congressional mandate’s effects were 
beginning to impact those procedural rights, Congress became 
simultaneously mired in one of the most divisive and unproductive 
periods in history.157 Because the coalition that originally enacted the 
Medicare appeals process has long dissolved, the duty to enforce those 
procedural rights falls to HHS and the courts. Given that an efficient 
administrative state is faithful to the intent of the enacting coalition, the 
D.C. Circuit was correct in finding mandamus jurisdiction. By 
addressing the Medicare appeals process as a whole instead of just the 
rights of one provider, and accurately viewing the escalation provision as 
a non-viable “alternative remedy,”158 the D.C. Circuit served the 
important role of protecting statutorily granted procedural rights, 
ensuring that the costs of health-care reform are not distributed 
disproportionately—a result that would be counter to the intent of the 
legislation. 
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